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Introduction	
 
For most observers, terrorism in Ireland has gone away. For those closer to the region, 
however, the issue has been frustratingly ambiguous. Though large-scale terrorist activity 
has been relegated to the past, an escalation of low-level terrorist activity by Irish 
Republican splinter groups has recently reached its highest level in ten years.  Breakaway 
Irish Republican terror groups, known as ‘the dissidents’ (characterised by their refusal to 
sign up to the 1998 peace accord) came to the fore when in March 2009, when members 
of two such groupings claimed responsibility for three murders. Within a period of 48 
hours, members of the Real IRA shot dead two soldiers at Massareene Barracks, while 
Continuity IRA members shot and killed a member of the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI).  
 
Though these murders represented the most dramatic examples of residual terrorism in 
Ireland since the 1998 Omagh bombing, the attacks signaled a dramatic turn in an already 
steady rise in activity from 2007 to today.  In 2010 alone, high level attacks ranged from 
the detonation of a bomb at a Newry courthouse in February to the targeting of a number 
of PSNI stations by dissident bombers throughout the year.  On April 2nd 2011, consistent 
with this overall rise in violent dissident Republican (VDR) activity, a car bomb planted 
by dissident Republicans murdered 25 year Catholic PSNI officer Ronan Kerr outside his 
home in Omagh, Co. Tyrone.   
 
But VDR activity goes far beyond the targeting of police, soldiers and targets of ‘national 
security’.  Recent years have also seen the return of punishment attacks and other forms 
of vigilante justice where, among others, suspected drug dealers and sex offenders have 
been targeted within traditionally Republican communities. In fact, the security situation 
in Northern Ireland has so worsened overall that British Home Secretary Theresa May, in 
September 2010, declared that the threat level posed by VDR organisations had risen 
from ‘moderate’ to ‘substantial’,1 further inferring that a VDR attack on the UK mainland 
was a ‘strong possibility.’2  This was echoed in the placement of the ‘activities of residual 
terrorist groups’3 alongside international terrorism as a ‘tier one’ security risk to the 
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national security of the United Kingdom.4  In the same month, Jonathan Evans, the 
Director General of MI5, publicly acknowledged that the Security Service has “seen a 
persistent rise in terrorist activity and ambition in Northern Ireland over the last three 
years.”5  
 
The acknowledgement of the rise in dissident Republican activity and the future threat 
posed by these organisations is consistent with data collected for a research project 
conducted at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism (ICST) at the 
Pennsylvania State University. The Violent Dissident Republicanism Project (hereafter 
VDR) began in October 2009 and seeks to provide a greater understanding of the 
development of violent dissident republicans, their organisations and activities. Through 
an extensive data collection effort from exclusively open source material,6 the VDR 
Project seeks to answer four primary questions: 
 
1. How and why do Irish dissident groups emerge? 
2. How can the VDR phenomenon be characterised?  
3. Who becomes involved in violent dissident Republicanism?  
4. What does VDR activity look like and how has it developed over time? 
   
The project sees the development of a large database on VDR events and personnel, the 
basic structure of which was described in a previous paper.7  While the academic 
literature on VDR groups and activity is still relatively young there have been a number 
of notable examples of publications that have significantly enhanced our understanding 
of this developing phenomenon.8  The literature to date, however, is largely descriptive in 
nature (though no less valuable as a result), with a significant lack of data to support the 
claims being made by some.  Central to the aims of this research project, and the resulting 
analysis, is to provide comprehensive quantitative data points that may allow us to further 
explore some of the issues only implicitly addressed in earlier literature.  In particular, the 
focus of the current article is to draw attention to the increasing nature and extent of 
violent activity associated with dissident groups through an analysis of VDR activity and 
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personnel from 1997 to 2010 and to identify patterns of activity that may provide us with 
an understanding of current and future directions for the dissidents.  
 
Who Are the Dissidents? 
The signing of Good Friday Agreement in 1998, and subsequently the St Andrews 
Agreement in 2006, effectively heralded an end to ‘The Troubles’.  The largest Irish 
Republican organisation of the second half of the twentieth century, the Provisional IRA 
(PIRA) has put its weapons beyond use and declared its full support for the exclusive use 
of peaceful politics as the strategy to achieve their goals.9  However, while Northern 
Ireland is for the first time in a generation ostensibly at peace, there remains a significant 
and growing threat posed to Northern Irish and British security by dissident Irish 
Republican organisations. These groups reject the Good Friday Agreement and advocate 
the continued use of violence to expel British influence from the region. 
 
There are three prominent and active violent dissident Republican organisations today. 
These represent the primary (though not exclusive) focus of the VDR Project, and are: 
The Real IRA (RIRA), The Continuity IRA (CIRA) and Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH). In 
addition to these groups, there are multiple smaller factions that also operate within 
Northern Ireland and across the island of Ireland.10  Confusion reigns as to the true nature 
and significance of what has been described as Republican “micro-groups”, with 
allegations that some of these represent proxy or even ghost groups.11  RIRA, CIRA and 
ONH, however, have been responsible for the deadliest activity since 1998 and have done 
more to assert their identities than any of the other, smaller coalitions that have largely 
centered around a tiny group or people, or specific geographical location.  
 
CIRA emerged as a result of the 1986 split within Provisional Republicanism that also 
saw the emergence of their political wing Republican Sinn Fein (RSF).  While the initial 
split took place in 1986 the military wing of the dissidents did not become ‘active’ until 
the mid-1990s.  2010 saw another divide when the paramilitary CIRA moved out from 
under the control of the RSF leadership who they believed were stifling them militarily.  
Eleven years after the initial Continuity split the group that is now known as the RIRA 
	 4
emerged from a further split within the PIRA. This was nominally due to the rejection of 
the Mitchell Principles by key core members of the PIRA leadership.  The paramilitary 
split coincided with the separation from Sinn Fein of the 32 County Sovereignty 
Committee (now 32 County Sovereignty Movement), a group commonly thought to be 
the political voice of RIRA.  In the years subsequent to these splits, and beyond PIRA, 
both paramilitary organisations – CIRA and RIRA - have experienced their own internal 
conflicts that have resulted in the formation of even more new dissident factions.  The 
most notable of these are two which both use the moniker of ONH, one of which split 
from the CIRA in Strabane and the other resulted in a more widespread national schism 
in RIRA.  Up until recently it was believed that ONH had no political wing.  However, at 
their 2011 Ard Fheis the ‘political pressure group’ Republican Network for Unity (RNU) 
sent ‘comradely greetings to Oglaigh Na hEireann.’12 
 
The recent dramatic increase in terrorist activity has generated significant debate among 
government, security officials and scholars about the threat posed by these dissident 
groups.13  The nature of these debates has ranged from critical and highly charged 
questions about the accuracy of the number of attacks, to utter confusion about how the 
nature of the threat has been characterised (confusion that ONH itself acknowledged as 
‘useful’).14  An artifact of this confusion in late-2010 saw the advent of a new collective 
term for the dissidents in the form of ‘residual terrorist groups.’  This is a phrase that has 
been promoted by representatives of the British and Irish governments as well as the 
PSNI.  The label was justified by concern about the apparent nobility associated with the 
term ‘dissident’.  In his previous capacity as Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs the current 
leader of Fianna Fail, Michael Martin, actively called for the discontinuation of the term 
‘dissident’: “[It] is a completely inappropriate term…[It] relates to people of conscience 
during the Cold War, and that term has no application to the kind of indiscriminate 
bombings which have taken place, or the murder of police officers or British Army 
personnel. They're betraying the republican tradition.”15 
 
This argument is not new.  For several years, Northern Ireland expert Jonathan Tonge 
rejected the use of the term ‘dissidents,’ and in its place refers to Irish Republican 
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‘ultras.’16  However, we assert that a change in terminology is not only unnecessary and 
inappropriate but potentially misleading. ‘Dissent’ does not convey a value judgment on 
the act of dissidence, or alternatively that from which is been dissented.  Consequently 
usage of the title ‘dissident’ does not place any value judgment on a group and is used to 
describe the defining characteristic of an individual or organisation.  The question is 
rather whether or not the act of dissent is the defining characteristic of the organisations 
being analysed?  It is our opinion that the answer to this must be yes.  Each of the groups 
under examination here have, through the act of schism or split, dissented from what is 
now accepted as ‘mainstream’ Republicanism.  While it is the case that ONH has actually 
split from other modern day dissident groups their most defining feature is still their core 
assertion of a rejection of Sinn Fein and the mainstream politicisation of Republicanism 
by its leadership.   
 
All of the dissident groups (including the non-violent dissident groups, addressed later) 
reject both the Good Friday and St. Andrews agreements. They also reject the acceptance 
of the PSNI as a legitimate policing force for the six counties of Northern Ireland.  Their 
stated beliefs are that any political settlement short of British withdrawal from Northern 
Ireland and an independent united Ireland fall too far short of their Irish Republican goals 
and therefore cannot be used as a justification for the permanent cessation of violence.  
 
However, and while we use the ‘dissident’ label here, this in no way implies homogeneity 
of organisation, ideological focus or tactical repertoire.  We acknowledge that within 
dissident Irish Republicanism there is ongoing competition and conflict between groups. 
There are also visible internal conflicts within specific groups, most notably the 
Continuity IRA.  While there have been actions, attacks and statements17 suggesting the 
possibility of a dissident coalition18 the overall picture is one of competition.  Though 
competition does not negate the possibility of dissident co-operation on some levels, it 
does acknowledge a certain level of autonomy across the groups.  In addition, that 
competition does not permeate only dissident Republicanism, but affects Republicanism 
and Nationalism on the whole.  Each of the currently active movements is in constant 
competition with each other to gain what little influence may be available within the 
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Republican community to leverage both membership and support.  Through their words 
and actions each Republican organisation proposes that they, and no other group, are the 
only legitimate Irish Republican group and that they are the ones who will ultimately 
bring about a united Ireland (one that Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, they argue, 
have failed to deliver). 
 
VDR Activity 1997-2010 
The VDR database essentially covers dissident activity in a post-Troubles Northern 
Ireland. The events section presents data collected from open sources for violent, non-
violent and threat of violence events. The data examined in this article will focus on the 
violent activities of VDR groups and individuals.  We examine violent activity from 1997 
to the 2010, while also highlighting the events at the beginning of 2011, so as to chart the 
evolution of dissident activity from the year prior to the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement up to the present day.  
  
For the 15 years under analysis the events database has recorded 968 primary events in 
total; 711 of these have been violent, 187 non-violent and 70 have been labeled as threats 
of violence.19  This section focuses on the violent events from 1997 to 2010, with 
reference to 2011 where appropriate.   
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, there has been a steady stream of violent events since 1997, 
with 2010 seeing a dramatic increase.  This pattern is consistent with increased activity in 
both 2008 and 2009. 185 violent events were recorded for 2010. The next highest annual 
rates of 91 in 2009, 55 in 2001 and 40 in 1998, the year of the Omagh bombing.  By 
April 20, 2011 there had already been 73 VDR events recorded for 2011, already making 
it the third most violent year in our database.  
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Figure 1: Violent Dissident Republican event activity from 1997 to 2010 
 
 
Particular years offer striking observations. Figure 1 displays a significant relative 
decrease in violent activity for 1999 with only 14 violent dissident attacks recorded, 
compared to 40 from the year previous.  This can be attributed to the extensive counter-
dissident activity in the aftermath of the Omagh bombing and the subsequent RIRA 
ceasefire from September 1998-1999.  Considering this, a closer examination of VDR 
activity shows that 38 of the 40 attacks of that year took place between January and 
August, with only 2 attacks20 occurring in the post-Omagh period. CIRA were 
responsible for both.  This would support the fact that national and international pressure, 
as well as counter-dissident strategies, in the aftermath of the Omagh bombing succeeded 
in its immediate aim of significantly weakening violent dissident activity.  
 
The massive increase for 2010 aside, we are presented with an overall increase since 
2007 that has invariably brought about the change in threat level posed by VDR groups 
and a recent stronger focus on dissident activity from security forces on both sides of the 
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border. Attempting to unravel this phenomenon further has given rise to significant 
challenges.  
 
When we consider group responsibility (see Figure 2) an unclear picture emerges. Of the 
185 acts of violence committed in 2010 and attributed broadly to Republican dissidents, 
101 have been commited by unknown perpetrators (that is to say, unattributable to any 
specific dissident grouping). This we can compare to 22 unattributed events in 2009 and a 
previous peak of 21 events much earlier in 2001.    
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Figure 2: Violent VDR Activity by group 
 
 
When we consider acts that can be attributed to a group (see Figure 3) some interesting 
patterns emerge. RIRA has been consistently the most active of all the groups.  2007-
2009 saw a significant increase in RIRA activity but was followed by a sudden decline in 
activity for 2010. There are several hypotheses to consider here. It may be that RIRA is 
responsible for some of the aforementioned unattributed attacks – this would be 
consistent with previous patterns of failure to immediately claim responsibility for events.  
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We suspect, however, a major contributing factor here is the confusion within the media 
about the emergence of ONH, and that since the formation of that group a number of 
events may have been wrongfully attributed to one group over the other. We discuss this 
issue further below. 
 
Figure 3: Violent VDR Activity by group (excluding Unknown) 
 
 
While the data here may indicate a decrease of RIRA activity for 2010 we do not believe 
that this represents an actual decrease in overall activity by the group.  Since 2007 RIRA 
activity has increased on an annual basis, and we believe that if and when the unattributed 
attacks are claimed by or attached to a specific group that the data will show the 
continued rise in RIRA activity. We believe this can also help explain the apparent 
stagnation in CIRA activity recorded for 2010. Another signal of how dramatic 2010 has 
been is that even if we completely disregard the ‘unknown’ event data, 2010 has still seen 
the second highest amount of violent activity by both groups, only surpassed in both 
cases by 2009. 
As above, a major development for 2010 has been the emergence of ONH and 
Republican Action Against Drugs (hereafter RAAD) as persistent threats to security.  The 
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2010 data suggests that RAAD was the most active VDR group from this year.  However, 
we believe that when all the ‘unknown’ events are accounted for that this will no longer 
be the case.  Of all VDR groups, RAAD are quickest to claim responsibility for their 
actions.  It is therefore less likely that the group were responsible for the unattributed 
attacks in 2010, and more likely that groups such as RIRA, ONH and CIRA are.  The 
emergence and significance of RAAD is discussed later. 
 
In 2008 and 2009 the database recorded only one violent confirmed ONH event each 
year. This has increased to eleven confirmed events for 2010.  However when the 
‘unknown’ events are factored in we suspect that for all three years ONH activity will be 
higher than initially apparent. There are three attacks that have been attributed to both the 
RIRA and ONH in 2010.  This may demonstrate the confusion within the media about 
which specific groups are responsible for particular events.  There have been instances 
where there have been claims and counter-claims by ONH and RIRA.  Most notable was 
in the aftermath of the April car-bomb attack on Palace Barracks in Belfast.  RIRA 
claimed responsibility for this attack before a representative of the Belfast branch of 
ONH contacted the Belfast Telegraph with a counter-claim, authenticated through the use 
of a recognised code word.21 In the absence of this kind of verified claim of 
responsibility, it is common for attacks to be described in the media as “dissident 
activity.” 
 
However, the multiple group events indicated for this year and others may demonstrate 
the potential for coalition.  While not a predominant policy to work together there have 
been examples of this on occasions in the past, notably the Omagh bombing in 1998.  The 
operation that claimed 29 lives was a combined action by the CIRA and RIRA with a 
crossover of organisational members involved in planting the bomb and calling in the 
inaccurate warning.22  There have also been recent indications in public statements that 
the individual groups are more willing to operationally work together.23 
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Bombing Incidents 
This increase in attacks from 2007-2010 is echoed specifically through bombs, both 
detonated and defused (See Figure 4).  2010 alone saw a total of 73 dissident bombing 
incidents - 41 devices defused by the security forces, and 32 devices that were actually 
detonated. This is in marked contrast to 24 (16 defused and 8 detonated) in 2009.  This 
increase in high-level activity (the highest year on record since the formation of the 
dissidents) supports the assumption that 2010 saw a growing sophistication in tactics, 
technology and determination on the part of the dissidents.  This bombing data 
corroborates the official rise in the threat level.24  
 
Figure 4: Bombing Incidents Detonated and Defused 
 
 
This data, similar to the overall violent data, on the one hand indicates the immediate 
success of the counter-dissident strategy post-Omagh – it appears that no bombings were 
even attempted by dissident groupings for all of 1999.  However, 2000 saw 14 detonated 
and 6 defused bombing incidents followed by 22 detonated and 14 defused in 2001.  For 
each year 2003-2010, excluding 2006 and 2007, the number of defused bombs has 
annually surpassed those detonated.  Already by April 20th 2011 there had been 21 
bombing incidents, 6 detonations and 15 bombs defused.  By the same time date in 2010 
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there had been 5 detonations and 10 defused.  As with the overall violent event data this 
suggests that 2011 is already fitting into the pattern of an annual rise in VDR activity. 
 
Hoax Devices 
A defining tactic of the dissident groups has been to disrupt the normalisation of Northern 
Irish society.  They have aimed to do so through the inducement of fear and the 
disruption of routine activity through their attacks and the resultant ongoing security 
alerts that intend to cause routine disturbance.  Nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
dramatic increase in hoax devices planted (see Figure 5).   
 
Figure 5: Hoax Devices and Warnings 
 
 
To successfully bring about a security alert and ensuing widespread disruption does not 
necessarily require the presence of a viable device.  An increase of hoax devices and 
warnings, from 12 in 2009 to 34 in 2010, indicates that it has been a deliberate core tactic 
of VDR groups not only to attack with viable devices but also to demonstrate their 
potential for destruction.  The planting of these hoax devices not only disrupts Northern 
Irish life but also over-extends the security service response units and EOD teams. These 
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hoax devices have to a significant extent targeted the transport infrastructure of Northern 
Ireland through their placement on motorways and railway tracks. While it has been a 
tactic used through the history of Republicanism at no period from 1997 to the present 
day has it been used so prominently as a tactic than in 2010.  Prior to 2009 the highest 
recorded rate of hoax devices in the present database was 7 in 2003. In fact, it is very 
likely that there is probably underreporting of these events - due to the non-lethal nature 
of these devices it is possible that not all of the instances of hoax attacks will be reported 
in the media, and therefore may not be recorded in the database. By the end of April 2011 
there had already been 25 separate hoax devices and warnings reported in Northern 
Ireland.  This is second only, in our data, to 2010 for annual levels of hoax incidents.  12 
of these incidents were in the days and weeks after the murder of Ronan Kerr.  While 
some may be indicative of genuine false alarms25 inevitable in the aftermath of a high 
profile attack, it is clear from the elaborate nature of some of the devices that these were 
deliberately planted by the dissident groups to disrupt the normalisation of Northern Irish 
society.   
 
2010 Violence 
While the concentration of violent activity so far has been through bombings and 
attempted bombings, viable and hoax devices, these do not account for all VDR activity 
in 2010.  Table 1 illustrates that in 2010, there were 46 shootings and punishment attacks, 
16 incidents of petrol bombs, 10 assaults, 8 acts of arson and 5 violent robberies. 
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Table 1: 2010 VDR Activity by Type 
Type of VDR Activity Number of Incidents in 2010 
Shootings and Punishment Attacks 46 
Defused Bomb Incidents 41 
Hoax Incidents 34 
Detonated Bomb Incidents 32 
Petrol Bomb Incidents 16 
Assaults 10 
Violent Riots 10 
Arson Incidents 8 
Violent Robberies 5 
Other 13 
 
This data indicates that the strategy of the groups is not just to disrupt normalization 
through attempted high-level bombings and hoax activity, but also to demonstrate 
perceived and desired local authority.  The rise in punishment attacks reflects the 
dissidents’ method of denouncing the Police Service of Northern Ireland as a legitimate 
police force. This rise in punishment attacks is nowhere better illustrated than through the 
recent emergence of the Derry-based group Republican Action Against Drugs (RAAD). 
RAAD represents the latest incarnation of Republican vigilante anti-drug groups.  The 
database recorded 27 confirmed violent actions by this group in 2010 and 9 in 2009, all 
of which invariably constituted punishment attacks and pipe-bombs targeting known and 
suspected drug dealers in Republican areas of Derry and the surrounding areas. As with 
all VDR activity one of the main functions of these actions is to increase levels of both 
passive and active support from the Republican communities in these areas.26  They do 
this under the guise of protecting the communities from ‘criminals’, and doing the job 
they claim the PSNI is not.  They target and intimidate convicted and suspected drug 
dealers, often times continuously targeting specific individuals over a long period of time.  
In 2010, for example, the group targeted Gavin Nixon, a convicted drug dealer from 
Hazelbank, Derry.  Nixon’s home was first targeted with a pipe-bomb in June and he was 
later kidnapped in September. He was subsequently released, releasing a statement 
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detailing his abduction and calling an end to his involvement in the drug trade.  In this 
statement he also warned all other drug dealers in the area of the potential for similar 
targeting of them, by RAAD, if they do not cease activity.27  It is not only drug dealers 
that are targeted by such attacks.  An example was the kneecapping of a 48-year-old 
convicted sex offender in the Carnhill28 area of Derry city in October 2010, an attack 
claimed by the RIRA.29 
 
VDR Personnel  
We have collected open source information on 641 individuals involved in dissident 
activity. 181 are classified as ‘convicted,’30 that is, a confirmed conviction for illegal 
activity in the context of involvement in a dissident Republican movement.  According to 
our data a further 78 are currently charged with VDR offences and are awaiting trial, and 
2 charged but who died prior to their court date.  In addition, data has also been collected 
on 24 individuals who were acquitted, and 28 whose charges were dropped prior to trial.  
There is additional data on 32 known supporters and ‘alleged’ members of VDR groups 
and 5 facilitators.  The remaining individuals are non-violent dissident Republicans, those 
who have demonstrated their dissidence through political activity and other non-violent 
methods.  While these individuals are, to our knowledge, not directly involved in violent 
dissident Republicanism they do provide a rare natural comparison to those who choose 
to enter violent dissident Republicanism.  For a full breakdown of the individual-level 
data contained within the database see Table 2. 
Table 2: VDR Personnel: Type 
Status of Personnel Number of Personnel 
Convicted 181 
Charged 80 
Acquitted 24 
Charges Dropped 28 
Alleged Members of VDR Group 32 
Facilitators of VDR Groups 5 
Political Dissident 286 
Convicted of Non-VDR Offence 1 
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Charged of Non-VDR Offence 1 
Community Activist 3 
 
Of the currently active groups the two largest affiliations are the RIRA and CIRA (see 
Table 3).  Of those convicted of VDR offences we have accounted for 92 RIRA 
members, 68 CIRA members and 2 further individuals for whom it is unclear whether 
they are CIRA- or RIRA-affiliated.  While these two groups constitute the largest number 
of convicted individuals in the database there have also been 2 ONH members and 1 
RAAD member, reflective of their recent increased activity as well as the transfer of 
allegiance of a number of personnel across groups. 
 
There are 15 individuals whose affiliation is unknown.  Also apparent from the data is the 
presence of one member of the ostensibly non-violent group Republican Network for 
Unity (RNU).  Overall this data is as expected due to the levels of activity of each group 
over the years.  As indicated earlier, these figures are only indicative of those who have 
been convicted and sentenced for VDR activity.  There are a number of others within the 
database who will potentially be included into this grouping if and when they are 
convicted. 
 
Table 3: Convicted VDR personnel affiliation 
VDR Group Number of Convicted Personnel 
RIRA 92 
CIRA 68 
ONH 2 
RAAD 1 
Unknown 15 
RNU 1 
RIRA or CIRA 2 
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Gender 
Despite recent analysis suggesting increasing evidence of a more predominant front-line 
role involvement in terrorism by women, even across groups,31 evidence of this does not 
currently emerge from the VDR database: VDR activity is significantly male-dominated.  
Convicted male personnel account for 98.34%.  This pattern of male dominance is 
similarly borne out when looking at the gender make-up of those charged and awaiting 
trial.  Within that grouping 96.05% are male with the remaining 3.95% female.  
 
These gender figures are consistent with previous studies.  In his 2004 quantitative 
evaluation of ETA militants Reinares’32 data on 625 ETA members active from 1970-
1995 suggested 93.6% male membership.33  His qualitative analysis, drawing on 
interview data, helped interpret this finding, with (exceptions aside) most of the front-line 
activist roles simply not being available to women and that this helped explain why men 
were more likely to be associated with violent activity.34  As the focus of the present 
study has been on charged and convicted members of VDR groups it is expected that 
when the overall structure of each terrorist organisation, and the variety of roles within 
these organisations, is examined more closely that a larger proportion of female members 
may become apparent. 
 
Age 
As illustrated in Figure 6, the most concentrated age range across the two biggest groups, 
CIRA and RIRA, is 31-40, with significantly high levels also between 41-50, 26-30, and 
51-60.   
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Figure 6: Age range of Convicted VDR Personnel as of December 31st 2010 
 
 
This data suggests two distinct groups of people join VDR groups.  The vast majority of 
younger dissidents aged 21-30, join VDR groups as their first ever experience of 
Republican activity.  The youngest members of the groupings will have had little to no 
adult experiences of the Troubles, and in some cases have not even been born in Northern 
Ireland. This issue raises significant questions for an analysis of motivational factors, 
with dissident leadership figures and those with previous active service in the Provisional 
IRA and early CIRA exploiting significant opportunities to glorify active involvement in 
militant Republicanism.  This point is further emphasised when the age range of those 
awaiting trial for VDR offences is analysed (see Figure 7).  The 31-40 age range is once 
again the most representative, however as 14-25 is the next highest age range this re-
affirms the hypothesis that an older experienced leadership is recruiting younger, 
inexperienced individuals.35  We return to this issue later.  By the end of 2010 none of the 
individuals who have been convicted of VDR offences were under the age of 21.  
However, 4 individuals charged and awaiting trial were between 14 and 20.  This 
explains the inclusion of this new column in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Age Range of Individuals Charged and Awaiting Trial as of December 31st 
2010 36 
 
 
While the data contained in Figure 6 illustrates the recent ages of convicted VDR 
personnel Figure 8 presents data depicting the age range of these individuals at the time 
of their first conviction. This data shows that the majority of the individuals started their 
Republican activity at a young age, with 17 having been convicted between 14 and 20 
years of age, a further 47 were convicted for activity conducted while they were in the 
age range 21-25 and 21 for activity between 26 and 30.   
 
Even though the data indicates that 77 were first convicted for activities while aged 31 
and older, the actual figure for first illegal activity is more than likely to be significantly 
lower.  This is due to the fact that this data, as with all our data, is only reflective of the 
information that can be supported by secondary sources and therefore this can only be 
regarded as age range at first (known) conviction rather than first actual illegal 
Republican activity, let alone the likely earlier again age at recruitment.  However, even 
with this stipulation the data indicates the range of extensive Republican experience 
within the dissident groups.  This supports the argument that the dissidents possess not 
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simply the intention to maintain a sustained paramilitary campaign but their experience 
levels indicate a heightened capacity to at least plan for this. 
 
Figure 8: Age Range at First Conviction for VDR Activity 
 
 
Focusing specifically on those whose first known illegal activity fell within the age range 
of 14-20, the first activities of only 2 people in this age-range pre-dates involvement in 
VDR activity.  This supports for the oft-stated declaration that the leaderships of the 
VDR groups are recruiting adolescents who could (by virtue of their age) have had little 
to no involvement in ‘the Troubles.’  
 
Only five individuals from this 14 to 20 age-range were convicted with specifically 
‘violent’ activity as their first conviction. The most common first convictions for people 
in this age group were ‘non-violent’ ones including weapons possession and the more 
generic charge of membership of an illegal organisation.  This is especially true for those 
at the younger end of this age range.  A suitable illustration of this is the 1999 case of the 
brothers Vincent (14) and Stephen Kelly (18) who were remanded in custody in 1999 
after attending a RIRA lecture and training camp in Stamullen, Co. Meath for which they 
both received suspended sentences for ‘unlawful drilling and marching.’  The younger of 
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the brothers, Vincent, was later sentenced, aged 21, to 5 years in prison in 2006 for 
membership of an illegal organisation (RIRA) and weapons possession.37  While the 
majority (11) of those aged 14-20 were first convicted of ‘non-violent’ activity, 7 later 
went on to be convicted for ‘violent’ dissident activity.  This may indicate a possible 
trajectory dynamic of membership, with individuals first tasked with ‘non-violent’ duties 
before they can be trusted to partake in violent activity.  
 
Current Status and Employment 
The need for steady recruitment of new personnel to ensure organisational survival is 
emphasised when the current status of personnel is examined. 69 personnel are currently 
serving prison sentences for VDR activity, with one other serving an ordinary criminal 
sentence.  These numbers, with a further 76 on (or awaiting) trial, represent only a 
portion of the estimated 600 plus ‘suspected’ dissidents reported by the police.38  To 
maintain heightened levels of activity these groups must constantly attract, recruit and 
train new personnel on the relevant skills required to successfully carry out attacks.  
Experienced personnel are also required to continue the training of the young recruits in a 
variety of roles. This requirement of recruiting personnel with a specific skill base is 
highlighted when the occupations of the personnel is analysed. 
 
While employment data is not available for the majority of the dissidents (a challenge 
commonly echoed by other researchers, including Reinares), we do have employment 
data on 56 of the convicted VDR personnel. 60.7% of these were actively employed 
while simultaneously involved in a VDR group, while 26.8% were unemployed at the 
time of conviction (see Table 4).  The VDR unemployment rates are certainly higher than 
those observed by Reinares for his ETA sample.  In his study he found only 0.6% 
unemployment at the time of recruitment to the Basque separatist movement.  
Table 4: Employment Status of convicted VDR personnel at time of conviction 
Employed 60.7%  
Unemployed 26.8% 
Student 9% 
Professional Criminal 3.5% 
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When the data is analysed by occupation and employment category it indicates that the 
VDR organisations seek recruits with specialised skillsets (see Table 5) that may prove 
beneficial to the pursuit of VDR objectives.  Of the 56 VDR activists on whom we have 
employment data, 16.07% were members, or former members, of a legal military 
organisation, dominantly the Irish Defence Forces.  These individuals bring with them 
formal training in the use of a variety of weapons and explosives.  While these skillsets 
are desirable to the VDR group in a general sense, it is the individual’s ability to pass on 
this training to fellow members and new recruits that can prove most beneficial.  
 
Table 5: Employment Categories of Convicted Personnel 
Employment Category % of VDR Personnel39 
Construction, maintenance and repair 23.2% 
Unemployed  21.4% 
Military 16.07% 
Service Sector 7.14% 
Student 8.93% 
Transportation 5.4% 
Agriculture 3.5% 
Industrial & Non-Specialised Workers 5.4% 
Engineering and Surveying 5.4% 
Technology 3.5% 
Professional Criminal  3.5% 
Unemployed Construction, maintenance and repair 3.5% 
Civil Servant 3.5% 
Entertainment 3.5% 
Unemployed Transport 1.75% 
 
Beyond the targeted recruitment of those with military experience, there is a long-
standing tradition within Irish Republicanism of targeting individuals with specific skill 
bases to benefit the implementation of organisational tactics. The largest occupational 
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sector among VDR recruits represents those in the ‘construction, maintenance and repair’ 
category.  This sector ranges from construction workers to those in the maintenance and 
repair trades, e.g. electricians, carpenters and mechanics.  23.2% of the VDR personnel 
are within this category. These individuals, coupled with the 4% from the engineering 
and technology sectors, may bring with them significant skillsets for aiding in the 
manufacturing, development and maintenance of viable explosive devices, as well as 
other weaponry and training devices.40  It is our belief that this skill-based recruitment of 
the VDR organisations has been deliberately conducted so as to provide them with a 
greater capacity to develop a longer-term (a la ‘long war’) strategy adopted by the 
Provisional predecessors.  Whether that represents a feasible or notional objective 
remains to be seen. 
 
Geographical Region 
The events data has shown that, as would be expected, the majority of the executed VDR 
events take place in Northern Ireland.  While there has been a small proportion of violent 
activity taking place in the Republic of Ireland this has invariably been in connection 
with feuds with organised crime gangs and unrelated to the political strategies of the 
VDR groups.  Northern Ireland remains their primary operational theater. However, the 
largest proportion of convicted VDR personnel thus far come from the Republic.  63 
convicted RIRA members were from the Republic and 20 in Northern Ireland. Similarly 
the majority of convicted CIRA members are from the Republic with 46 from the South 
and 20 from the North. There are also 9 convicted RIRA members who were based in 
Great Britain, 4 of these in England and 5 in Scotland.  (see Table 6). 
Table 6: Geographical Origins of convicted VDR members41 
VDR Group Northern 
Ireland 
Republic of 
Ireland 
Great 
Britain 
Unknown 
RIRA 20 63 9 0 
CIRA 20 46 1 1 
CIRA or RIRA 1 1 0 0 
Other 2 2 0 0 
Unknown 4 8 0 3 
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Figures 9 and 10 outline the convicted VDR personnel by geographical region, 
specifically at county level.  What emerges from this is that while a significant proportion 
of the convicted VDR personnel were located within the six counties of Northern Ireland 
the two main county hubs for the groups are within the Republic of Ireland.  Of the 
Southern counties the majority of convicted members particularly in the Real IRA, as 
shown in Figure 9, are based in Dublin and the border county of Louth.42  While Dublin 
has the largest population in Ireland, both north and south, and therefore would be 
expected to comprise a large membership, Louth has only the twenty-second largest 
population of the thirty-two counties, and has a smaller population than all but one (Co. 
Fermanagh) of the Northern Ireland counties.43 
 
Figure 9: Dublin and Louth based convicted VDR Personnel  
 
 
Within Northern Ireland the distribution of convicted membership is more evenly spread, 
rather than focusing on specific ‘hubs’ as is apparent in the South, with Antrim, Armagh, 
Fermanagh and Tyrone having the most sizeable VDR populations (see Figure 10).  
While Tyrone has only 8 convicted dissidents the very recent emergence of a new violent 
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dissident organization in the county, calling themselves simply “the IRA”, was reported 
at the beginning of 2011.44  It is this group that claimed responsibility for the murder of 
Ronan Kerr. With the emergence of this new VDR group originating from this county 
this VDR population is likely to grow in 2011 and the years ahead.   
 
Figure 10: Northern Ireland based convicted VDR personnel 
 
 
For the RIRA the concentration of their convicted members are from these two counties 
in the Republic.  We have recorded 20 convicted RIRA members in the whole of 
Northern Ireland, compared to 45 in Louth and Dublin combined. CIRA have 20 
convicted members in Northern Ireland and 22 in Louth and Dublin.  When all groups are 
combined there are 47 convicted VDR personnel accounted for across Northern Ireland 
and 75 in Dublin and Louth.   
 
This disparity between VDR event and personnel locations additional challenges for 
those tasked with countering VDR activity, especially due to fact that the disparity cannot 
be understood in the absence of a close examination of cross-border differences.  The two 
main county hubs of VDR group membership are in the Dublin and Louth (with small 
groupings emerging in Republic of Ireland counties previously unassociated with PIRA 
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activity during the Troubles) while the vast majority of the VDR events take place in the 
six counties of Northern Ireland: recruitment and initial training takes place in one 
jurisdiction, while direct action (outside of training) predominantly occurs in another.  
While the Republic of Ireland has not been the target of VDR violence this does not mean 
that the role of the security services in the south should be solely relegated to countering 
recruitment and organisational membership.  Because of the large proportion of the 
dissident membership living in the Republic of Ireland this would indicate a strong 
likelihood that some degree of planning and training for actual VDR attacks has 
originated there. 
 
Analysis of convicted VDR personnel by county does not provide an unambiguous 
depiction of the geographical makeup of VDR personnel.  There is often a considerable 
time period between charge and conviction.  We should interpret any data on charged 
individuals with the obvious limitations that accompany that data. It does provide, 
however, a useful comparison point with the data on convicted members. In this regard a 
significant change has been observed with respect to the geographical location of 
convicted and charged VDR personnel.  While the convicted personnel, and therefore 
those partaking in the earlier VDR activity, were predominantly based in the Republic of 
Ireland this is not reflected in the ‘charged’ personnel data. As Table 7 shows the 
majority (59.3%) of those charged and awaiting trial for VDR offences are based in 
Northern Ireland.  If this predominance of Northern Irish personnel is reflected in future 
convictions it would suggest a significant shift in the location of those engaging in VDR 
activity.  While those engaging in earlier VDR activity were predominantly based in the 
Republic of Ireland, especially Dublin and Louth, the ‘charged’ data could suggest that 
the VDR groups are now more Northern dominated.  When this is considered in 
conjunction with age and past activity data those being charged of VDR activity include a 
combination of experienced Republicans returning to ‘active service’ and new recruits 
with no previous experience of Republican activity.  
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Table 7: Geographical origins of individuals charged with VDR offences45 
VDR Group46 Northern 
Ireland 
Republic of 
Ireland 
Great 
Britain 
Unknown 
RIRA 12 7 0 2 
CIRA 13 7 1 0 
ONH 7 0 0 0 
Other 5 1 0 0 
Unknown 11 15 0 0 
   
Figure 11 further suggests an apparent Northern dominance.  While the convicted data 
was dominated by those from Dublin and Louth this data would suggest that the four 
counties of Antrim, Armagh, Derry and Tyrone, alongside the two southern counties, 
now provide the majority of VDR personnel.  If this is borne out in convictions we will 
be provided with evidence of a major shift in the operational make-up of VDR groups, 
with inevitable implications for the formulation and evolution of responses to counter this 
activity.47  
Figure 11: Northern Ireland, Dublin and Louth based individuals charged with 
VDR offences 
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Conclusions 
This article represents a snapshot analysis of data from a larger, ongoing research 
programme, the VDR Project. Though we are seeing evidence of the increasing analysis 
of the VDR phenomenon, much of what currently exists relies far less on primary source 
data to help guide the formulation of key analytic questions. The main goal of this article 
was to provide an overview of critical data points both to supplement existing analysis as 
well as to facilitate further exploration of this increasing problem. Perhaps the most 
dramatic immediate finding from the data has been the enormous rise in VDR activity in 
2009 and 2010, with at least 185 confirmed violent acts in 2010 alone.  This escalation 
has been observed uniformly across all types of violent activity, both high level and low 
level, as well as hoax bombings.  The data appears to support the argument that the threat 
posed by VDR organisations remains ‘substantial’.  No other year of dissident activity 
has seen as significant an increase in all levels of violent activity as that of 2010. In 
addition to the common question about whether or not the dissidents have a ‘plan’ (i.e. a 
longer-term strategy outside of their efforts to disrupt the normalisation process) a more 
immediate question about 2010 activity has been whether it represents an anomaly or 
‘blip’ as far as the long-term development of VDR groups is concerned. An examination 
of open source data appears to indicate heightened capacities of VDR groups in both 
developing operations and members taking part in increased activities.  This suggests 
sustained and focused recruitment, not just of ‘fresh skins’ (particularly for involvement 
in hoax operations), but skilled former IRA personnel (strongly suggested by the 
technological sophistication of recent bombs). This increased level of activity currently 
shows no sign of abating. In addition to technological innovation, the increase of 
successfully detonated bombs in particular suggests (but is not evidence for) the 
recruitment of skilled bomb makers in recent times.48  As with the overall levels of 
violent activity there is no indication that the increase in bombings and attempted 
bombings in 2010 represents the zenith of dissident bombing activity.    
 
While the event data indicates that the centre of violent activity is still within Northern 
Ireland, and that the tactics of the groups are aiming to disrupt the normalisation of this 
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state, the membership was, previously, primarily from the south.  The reason for specific 
centres of strength in the Republic of Ireland cannot be explained in the same way as 
equivalent clusters in Northern Ireland. While the early conviction data shows the 
dominance of Republic of Ireland personnel the current ‘charged’ data suggests a shift. 
The ‘charged’ data suggests that now the majority of the membership is based in 
Northern Ireland.  If this proves true it would demonstrate a significant evolution of the 
VDR groups.  
 
This pattern of increased violence has already been observed in the first four months of 
2011.  While there has been a number of attacks already in the year the most prominent 
was the murder of Catholic PSNI officer Ronan Kerr in Omagh.  This led to public outcry 
on both sides of the border and abroad.  However, even though it was clear that the wider 
society, across all communities, was and is against the continuation of VDR activities the 
disparate groupings have continued their activities by planting both viable and hoax 
bombs as well as carrying out a number of low level punishment attacks.   
 
We must consider 2010 in the overall context of developments in Northern Ireland since 
the Good Friday Agreement to gain a more comprehensive picture of the evolution of 
VDR activity.  In the immediate aftermath of the 1998 Omagh bombing there was 
significant decrease in VDR activity, with no bombings even attempted in 1999.  This is 
a reflection of the significant counter VDR strategies and tactics employed in response to 
the attacks.  However, 2000 and 2001 saw activity increase once more.49  This indicates 
success in immediate but not longitudinal counter dissident strategies.  While the groups 
were significantly weakened in the direct aftermath of the bombing they demonstrated a 
capacity for resurgence. They not only re-activated their campaigns but sought to 
reinvigorate support in key locations in the Republic of Ireland and to establish training 
camps. As a post-conflict society, Northern Ireland in particular, however, needs not just 
an immediate reactive solution to this increasing threat, but a longitudinal and sustained 
effort that is effective across all time periods not just in the immediate aftermath of 
significant attacks.  A counter-VDR strategy must take into account the constantly 
changing social and political circumstances across the island of Ireland, and specifically 
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within Republicanism.  One of the most significant changes within Irish Republicanism 
in recent times has come with Sinn Fein’s explicit support of the PSNI.  The data 
suggests that the rise in VDR activity has coincided with this significant action by 
mainstream Republicanism. To this effect, a counter-dissident strategy will come not 
only from the security services and armed forces, but perhaps most immediately also 
from within the Republican and Nationalist communities, the support of which the 
dissidents will increasingly seek to convert and exploit.  The Republican community 
across Northern Ireland still believe that their true leadership comes from the Republican 
Movement, which since the mid-1970s has invariably been the Provisional IRA and Sinn 
Fein (and personified through Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams).  Throughout the 
Troubles and the peace process this community has been strongly influenced by the 
beliefs and actions of the Provisional leadership.  It is mostly from within this community 
that the dissidents are competing with mainstream Republicanism for membership and 
support.  It is more likely that it will be the actions, statements and beliefs of Sinn Fein 
and former PIRA members that will contribute to deterring young people from joining or 
supporting the VDR groups than the actions of the British state, its politicians and 
security forces.  It is therefore a universally positive development to hear the continued 
denunciation of dissident violence from the deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness, his 
colleagues within Sinn Fein,50 and also non-political groupings such as the Gaelic 
Athletic Association (GAA).  A key role for the Sinn Fein leadership will likely come 
from their continued participation in mainstream democratic politics both north and south 
of the border.  The actions and statements of the VDR groups may wish to illustrate the 
rejection of the politicisation of mainstream Republicanism by the wider Republican 
population.  However, the continued success of a fully politicised Sinn Fein at the polls 
provides the most significant indication of the delegitimisation of the existence and 
actions of these groups and their rejection by the vast majority of the Irish Republican 
population.  It is, and likely to remain, a major strategic objective of the dissidents, 
however, to portray Sinn Fein as a ‘nearer’ enemy in the short- to medium-term than the 
British government. It is not inconceivable that Sinn Fein members (ironically, not unlike 
Catholic recruits to PSNI) are unlikely to emerge unscathed as a target should the 
dissidents develop the capacity to expand their military repertoire.  
	 32
 
It is important to acknowledge also that there are also those individuals and groups within 
the dissident Republican community who exhibit their dissension through non-violent 
actions and statements.  This article has not addressed these actors, nor have we 
addressed the broader implications of many of these data points for the development of a 
counter-VDR strategy.  However, it is our opinion that non-violent dissident Republicans 
have an important role to play in helping counter the rising VDR threat. They provide an 
alternative venue for those who wish to express their dissident Republican sentiments, 
but have a potentially critical role to play in channeling visible youth dissent (a common 
occurrence in post-conflict societies) that is being exploited by VDR leadership in an 
effort to help swell their ranks and build ground support. On the personnel data there is 
evidence for two distinct age-ranges present in VDR groups; the younger 14-30 age-
group, most of whom are having their first experiences of active Republicanism and the 
31-50 category continuing on or revisiting Republican activism.  This trend deserves 
close consideration. The rationale for the engagement of the younger generation in 
dissident Republican activity is qualitatively different to that of their older comrades.51  
While many of the younger generation are experiencing Republican activism for the first 
time the majority of the older generation have previously been involved in other 
Republican movements, predominantly the PIRA.  They have left to join, or form, these 
new organisations, due to their disillusionment with the peace process and what they see 
as the negative consequences of the politicisation of the Provisional Republican 
Movement. The cornerstone of any organisation’s survival must be the group’s ability to 
recruit these new members, a point further emphasised by the increase in VDR personnel 
serving lengthy sentences.52  The nature of involvement and engagement in terrorism 
leads to a high turnover of membership for multiple reasons that are well documented.53 
This is perhaps especially pertinent for the VDR groups in their early phase of inception 
due to competition for membership within a finite community, or in a geographical sense, 
immediately surrounding a particular leadership figure (certainly the case for RIRA and 
ONH). But for the VDR groups the necessity for survival and progress is not just the 
simple recruitment of numbers.  If the group is to be successful they must recruit 
members with particular skills to aid and benefit in the training and active service of the 
	 33
organisation.  This is suggested by the emerging data on the occupations of VDR 
personnel.  It may suggest specific targeting of those with formal military training as well 
as others from a construction and ‘trades’ background.  These two sectors provide the 
group with the requisite skills to continue their development and maintenance of 
weaponry and explosives as well as the training of new recruits, a first step in the 
development of a longer-term strategy that the dissidents are not currently viewed as 
having the ability to formulate, let alone exploit.  
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Appendix A: Database Structure and Headings 
 
VDR Events Database Headings 
 
1. Timing 
 Month 
 Day 
 Year 
 MM/DD/YYYY 
2. Location 
 Region 
 County 
 City/Town 
 Street 
 Policing District/Division 
 LAT/LONG 
3. Responsibility 
 VDR Group 
 Claimed 
 Perpetrator’s Name 
4. Event Type 
 Violent/Non-Violent/Threat of Violence 
 Event Type 
 Weapon 
 Number of Devices 
 Number of Locations 
 Other Events Possibly Connected to 
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5. Direct Victims 
 Dead 
 Wounded 
 Hostage 
 Total 
 Victim/Target Type 
 Age of Victims 
6. Summary and Sources 
 Event Summary 
 Sources 
 
VDR Personnel Database Headings 
 
1. Biographical Data 
 ID Number 
 Name  
 Gender 
 Date of Birth 
 Month of Birth 
 Day of Birth 
 Year of Birth 
 Date of Death 
 Age as of December 31st 2010 
 Age Range as of December 31st 2010 
 Marital Status 
 Children 
2. Residential Data 
 Place of Birth 
 Policing District/Division (Place of Birth) 
 North/South 
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 Known Addresses 
 Policing District/Division (Known Address)  
 County 
3. Occupational and Educational Data 
 Occupation 
 Socio-Economic Status 
 Education Level Attained 
4. VDR Affiliation 
 VDR Group 
 Prior Affiliation 
 Convicted/Charged/Political 
5. VDR Activity and Position 
 Age at Recruitment 
 Year of Recruitment 
 Age Range at Recruitment 
 Year of First Known Activity 
 Year of First Known Illegal Activity 
 Age Range at First Known Illegal Activity 
 Type of First Known Illegal Activity 
 Year of First Known Current Group Activity 
 Age Range at First Known Illegal Group Activity 
 Type of First Known Current Group Activity 
 Type of First Known Current Group Illegal Activity 
 Year of Last Known Illegal Activity 
 Type of Last Known Illegal Activity 
 Age at Last Known Illegal Activity  
 Sub-Grouping 
 Position in Movement 
 Role in Illegal Activities 
 Period of Illegal Activities 
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6. Status 
 Current Status 
 Place of Arrest 
 Policing District/Division of Arrest 
 Length of Sentence 
 Plea 
 Number of VDR Convictions 
 Length of Sentences 
 Date of Charges 
 Date of Convictions 
 Ordinary Criminal Convictions 
 Date of Status Update 
7. Acquaintances 
 ID No. of Family 
 ID of Acquaintances Pre-Joining 
 ID of Acquaintances Post-Joining 
 Operational Acquaintances 
 Immediate Family 
 Relatives 
8. Summary and Sources 
 Information 
 Sources 
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Appendix B: Convicted VDR personnel by County 
 
 CIRA RIRA ONH RAAD CIRA 
or 
RIRA 
RNU Unknown Total 
Antrim 6 4 0 0 1 0 0 11 
Armagh 4 6 0 0 0 0 1 11 
Carlow 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Clare 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Cork 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Derry 0 3 0 1 0 1 1 6 
Donegal 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Down 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Dublin 17 24 1 0 0 0 4 46 
Fermanagh 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Kerry 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Kildare 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Leitrim 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Limerick 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Louth 5 20 1 0 1 0 1 28 
Meath 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Monaghan 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Sligo 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Tipperary 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Tyrone 3 3 0 0 0 0 2 8 
Waterford 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Westemeath 
and Dublin 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Wexford 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Unknown 1 2 0 0 0 0 3 6 
Great Britain 1 9 0 0 0 0 0 10 
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Appendix C: Individuals Charged of VDR Activity by County 
	
 CIRA RIRA ONH RAAD CIRA 
or 
RIRA 
RNU IRA Eirigi Unknown Total 
Antrim 1 3 4 0 0 1 0 1 3 13 
Armagh 6 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 12 
Carlow 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Cavan 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Derry 0 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 9 
Donegal 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Down 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Dublin 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 
Fermanagh 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Galway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Kildare 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Louth 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 9 
Louth and 
Derry 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Monaghan 3 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 5 
Tyrone 1 4 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 10 
Waterford 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Wexford 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Unknown 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Great Britain 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
	
 
